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Jeff Kochan’s Science as Social Existence (2017) presents an engaging study of two perspectives 
on science and scientific knowledge: Heidegger’s existential phenomenology and the 
sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK). The book sets down an interesting path to merge 
the two traditions. Kochan tries to navigate the path’s turns and terrains in original and 
fruitful ways.  
 
Here, I offer reflections from the perspective of SSK and more specifically, the Edinburgh 
School’s Strong Programme in the sociology of scientific knowledge. I contend that 
Kochan’s work does not represent or engage with SSK satisfactorily, and is hindered in its 
accomplishments as a result. I begin by considering Kochan’s most important claims and 
ambitions, before turning to my analysis. 
 
The Nature of the Argument 
 
First, Jeff Kochan claims that Heidegger’s existential phenomenology and SSK can fix each 
other’s flaws and can together constitute a superior framework for analysing science and its 
epistemic work and products. Kochan elaborates this first claim by using the next two. 
 
Second, he argues that Heidegger’s work can resolve what he considers to be SSK’s long-
running and unresolved problem concerning the relationship between knowledge-makers 
and the world about which they make knowledge. Kochan claims that the Strong 
Programme employs a form of realism that draws a divide between the knower and the 
world. He refers to this realism as a ‘glass-bulb model.’ Kochan goes on to state that 
‘alternatives to [the glass-bulb model] have already begun to earn a respected place within the 
broader field of science studies,’ (2017, 33) though he offers no examples to support the 
claim. He contends that Heidegger’s assistance is imperative since ‘science studies scholars 
can no longer take external-world realism for granted’ (ibid.).  
 
Third, Kochan suggests that SSK can resolve Heidegger’s comparatively limited 
understanding of ‘the social.’ That is, the former can lend its social scientific perspectives 
and methods to bolster Heidegger’s insufficient explanation of human collectives and their 
behaviour.  Not only does SSK offer a more detailed understanding, it also contributes tools 
with which to carry out research. 
 
Finally, in his reply to Raphael Sassower’s review, Kochan dismisses the former’s criticisms 
about the book’s failure to address social phenomena such as capitalism, neoliberalism, and 
industrial-academic-military complexes (Sassower 2018) by saying, ‘these are not what my 
book is about’ (Kochan 2018, 3). Kochan contends that he cannot be faulted for not 
accomplishing goals that he never set out to accomplish. This response serves as the starting 
point for my own analysis. 
 
I agree with the basics of Kochan’s reply. Sassower’s criticisms overlook or disregard the 
author’s intents, and like all authors Kochan is entitled to set his own goals. However, the 
sympathy that Kochan expects from Sassower is not one that he offers David Bloor, Barry 
Barnes or the others in SSK whom he criticises.  
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His principal criticism—the second claim above—relies on a misrepresentation of the 
Strong Programme’s ambitions and concerns. That is, Kochan does not describe what their 
work is about accurately. Moreover, what Kochan looks to draw from SSK more broadly—
the third claim above—features little in the book. That is, Kochan’s book is not really about 
one of things that it is supposed to be about. 
 
Here, I will first explain Kochan’s misrepresentation of Strong Programme goals and the 
resultant errors in his criticism. Next, I will examine Kochan’s lack of concern for crucial 
aspects of SSK, which reflects both his misrepresentation of the tradition and his choice not 
to engage with it meaningfully. 
 
Aims and Essentials in SSK 
 
Kochan’s unfair criticisms of the Strong Programme (and SSK more broadly) first involve 
the tradition’s treatment of ontological issues. Kochan argues that the Strong Programme 
does not offer a satisfactory analysis of the world’s existence. When he introduces SSK in 
the book’s first chapter, he does so by focusing on ‘the problem of how one can know that 
the external world exists’ (2017, 37). And yet, this was never a defining concern for those 
who developed SSK. Their work was not about ontology. For most of them, it still is not. 
 
Kochan claims that the Strong Programme failed by not delivering a convincing argument 
for ‘the claim that the subject can, in fact, know that this world, as well as the things within 
it, actually exists’ (2017, 49). Bloor and Barnes’ realist position accepts a basic 
presupposition, held implicitly by people as they live their lives, that the world with which 
they interact exists.  Kochan chastises this form of realism because it does not ‘establish the 
existence of the external world’ (2017, 49).  
 
But again, this was never the tradition’s intent nor is it a requisite for their actual intents. The 
Strong Programme did not entirely ignore ontology. Knowledge and Social Imagery, in which 
Bloor presents the fundamental aims and methods of the Strong Programme, mentions and 
engages with some ontological topics (1976). Nonetheless, they form a very limited part of 
the book and the tradition, and so should not take precedence when evaluating SSK. 
Kochan’s criticism employs a form of misrepresentation similar to the one he dislikes when 
Sassower applies it to Science as Social Existence. 
 
Moreover, Kochan faults the Strong Programme for doing what it hoped to do. He argues 
that the main hurdle to correcting Bloor and Barnes’s flawed realism is the scholars’ 
‘preoccupation with epistemological, at the expense of ontological, issues’ (2017, 50). 
Knowledge and Social Imagery begins with an explicit declaration of ambitions, all of which 
concern epistemology and social studies of knowledge. Kochan either dismisses or ignores 
those aims in order to convey the importance and strength of his arguments. He does the 
same for other SSK fundamentals. 
 
On several occasions, Kochan chooses to cast aside concerns or commitments that are vital 
to the Strong Programme. For instance, when he employs Heidegger’s phenomenology to 
challenge the Strong Programme’s criticism of external-world sceptics, Kochan writes: 
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from the standpoint of Heidegger’s own response to the external-world sceptic, the 
distinction SSK practitioners draw between absolute and relative knowledge is 
somewhat beside the point. (2017, 48) 
 
And yet, few things are as explicitly vital to the Strong Programme as a clear rejection of 
absolutism and a wholehearted commitment to relativism. In Knowledge and Social Imagery, 
Bloor writes that ‘[there] is no denying that the strong programme in the sociology of 
knowledge rests on a form of relativism.’ (1976, 158) Elsewhere, he summarises the basic 
relation between absolutism and relativism as follows: 
 
… if you are a relativist you cannot be an absolutist, and if you are not a relativist you 
must be an absolutist. Relativism and absolutism are mutually exclusive positions. 
(2007, 252) 
 
Bloor’s writings on the study of knowledge, like his analyses of rules and rule-following 
(1997), invariably draw distinctions between absolutism and relativism and unequivocally 
commit to the latter. As such, when Kochan treats the distinction as ‘somewhat beside the 
point,’ he is marginalising an indispensable component of what he sets out to criticise. 
Finally, Kochan at times disregards the importance of social collectives to the Strong 
Programme and SSK more broadly. For instance, when analysing Bloor’s perspective on 
referencing as an intentional state requiring specific forms of content, Kochan writes: 
 
For the purposes of the present analysis, whether that content is best explained in 
collectivist or individualist terms is beside the point. (2017, 79) 
 
Crucial to social science is the relationship (and often the distinction) between collective and 
individual phenomena. The Strong Programme embraces and employs collectivism, and in 
part distinguishes itself through its understanding of knowledge as a social institution. Thus 
the distinction between individualism and collectivism is not ‘beside the point,’ and 
understanding SSK demands a dedicated concern for the social. Unfortunately, Kochan does 
not recognise its importance.  
 
The Social and Practice 
 
As part of his attempt to draw Heidegger and SSK into partnership, Kochan argues that the 
former can benefit from SSK’s comprehension of the social and its tools for exploring its 
phenomena. However, Kochan dedicates a surprisingly small part of his book to discussing 
social scientific topics. Most notably, his explanation of the social character of scientific 
work and scientific knowledge is very limited and lacks the detail and nuance that he offers 
when discussing Heidegger and ontology. 
 
Kochan repeatedly explains the social by referring to ‘tradition.’ He writes that Heidegger 
and SSK both ‘regard science as a finite, social and historical practice’ (2017, 208) but relies 
on opaque notions of history and tradition to support the claim. He refers to the ‘history of 
thinking’ (2017, 6) that determines how a community behaves and knows, and contends that 
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an individual’s understanding of things ‘can be explained by reference to the tradition which 
structures the way she thinks about those things’ (2017, 221).  
 
The inherited a priori framework that structures thinking gains its authority from the 
‘tradition which both enables and is sustained by [the everyday work-world]’ (2017, 224). 
Finally, Kochan argues that Bloor and Heidegger study normativity—a topic crucial to 
SSK—by ‘tracing its origin back to tradition’ (2017, 217). 
 
Kochan rests his explanation of the social on ‘history’ and ‘tradition,’ but never offers an 
explicit, clear definition of either one. Although on occasion he employs terms like ‘socio-
cultural,’ Kochan does not dedicate attention to SSK’s concern for social collectives. He 
mentions the importance of socialisation, but does not support the claim with evidence or 
analysis. As such, Kochan does not explore or employ the field’s social scientific concepts or 
methods, both of which he describes as the tradition’s contribution to his hybrid theory. 
 
Kochan’s lack of concern for the social also involves a general disregard for scientific 
practice. Early in the book, Kochan states that he will demonstrate how SSK and Heidegger 
offer ‘mutually reinforcing models of the way scientists get things done’ (2017, 8). However, 
he does not address the lived undertakings involved in scientific work.  
 
The way scientists get things done’ concerns more than their place within an abstract 
notion of tradition. It also involves what practitioners do, including the most 
mundane of behaviours. Kochan criticises science studies for arguing that ‘theory 
can be unproblematically reduced to practice. (2017, 57).  
 
He offers no evidence that science studies believes this, though if it did, Kochan would be 
correct. Understanding science and its knowledge cannot be reduced entirely to making 
sense of its practices; science is more than what specific groups of people do. However, 
understanding science also cannot circumvent what happens in places like laboratories, fields 
and conferences rooms. 
 
One example of Kochan’s omission of practice is his discussion of Joseph Rouse’s criticisms 
of Heidegger’s ‘theory-dominant account of the scientific enterprise’ (2017, 86). Heidegger’s 
analysis of science rests on the notion that specific forms of ‘projection’ underlie our 
epistemic engagement with entities and events. Science’s start involved a ‘change-over’ to a 
mathematical form of projection called mathesis and a ‘shift in experience within the range of 
possible understandings of nature opened up by the mathematical projection’ (2017, 90).  
 
Rouse criticises Heidegger for never offering a satisfactory explanation of how ‘change-
overs’ from one projection to another occur. Kochan challenges Rouse much as he criticises 
science studies: by saying that the latter wants to reduce everything to practice at the total 
expense of theory. I believe that Kochan fails to engage with the real issue. If Rouse supports 
a practice-only explanation of science—which Kochan does not demonstrate convincingly—
then the former’s position is flawed.  
 
However, Rouse’s failure would not resolve Heidegger’s problem. The latter would still not 
offer a clear explanation of what occurs in the lived world of scientific work. He would still 
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fail to explain how change-overs happen. It is hardly radical to suggest that science is 
something that was developed by communities of people doing certain things. If its birth 
involved a novel form of projection, then it is also hardly radical to wonder how that 
projection came to be. 
 
Moreover, Heidegger’s mathesis veers Kochan away from the particularities and nuances of 
scientific work. He writes: 
 
Heidegger’s account of modern science as mathesis began with Heidegger’s insistence 
that facts, measurement, and experiment, broadly construed, figure as continuous 
threads running from modern science all the way back through medieval to ancient 
science. (2017,  281) 
 
Such a claim relies on an excessively broad conceptualisation of facts, measurements, 
experiments and other lived components of science. It does not reflect the workings of 
scientific practice, which SSK seeks to investigate. In a sense, commitment to the claim 
involves a belittling of empirical study. It also involves marginalising one of SSK’s most 
important contributions to the study of science: its methodologies. 
 
Missing Methodologies 
 
Kochan does not present any analysis of SSK methodologies, nor does he offer his own. To 
some, methodologies might appear to be secondary components of theoretical traditions. To 
those in SSK and especially those who developed the Strong Programme, methodologies are 
all-important.  
 
In the first and second pages of Knowledge and Social Imagery, Bloor introduces his aims in the 
book and his ambitions for the programme he is about to present. He states that the purpose 
of his book is to challenge social scientific and philosophical arguments that fail to place 
science and its knowledge ‘within the scope of a thorough-going sociological scrutiny’ (1976, 
4). Bloor then explains that as a result, ‘the discussions which follow will sometimes, though 
not always, have to be methodological rather than substantive’ (1976, 4).  
 
Put simply, Bloor sets out to demonstrate that science can be studied sociologically and to 
establish the methods with which to carry out those studies. He introduces four tenets—of 
causality, impartiality, symmetry and reflexivity—and states that they will ‘define what will be 
called the strong programme in the sociology of knowledge’ (1976, 7) As such, I believe that 
Kochan’s lack of concern for methodology is another example of overlooking what SSK 
seeks to do. Moreover, it is an example of Kochan not incorporating SSK meaningfully into 
his hybrid theory. 
 
In his introduction, Kochan summarises each chapter’s aim and content. He describes 
Chapter 6 as an exploration of a historical episode involving Robert Boyle and Francis Line, 
as well as an evaluation of Bloor’s concept of ‘social imagery’ and Heidegger’s notions of 
‘world picture’ and ‘basic blueprint.’ Kochan writes: 
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Bloor’s work suggests ways in which Heidegger’s concepts of ‘world picture’ and 
‘basic blueprint’ might be rephrased and further developed in a more sociological 
idiom...” (2017, 15) 
 
Here, Kochan seems to describe the potential of Bloor’s scholarship as principally a 
semantic reformulation of Heidegger’s ideas, or at most a set of concepts that can make 
Heidegger’s work more accessible to practitioners in SSK and other social studies of science. 
I believe this is one symptom of a broader and very important trouble. Kochan does not 
consider the possibility that the Strong Programme and SSK involve more than concepts.  
 
He does not acknowledge vital parts of the traditions with great potentialfor his mission. He 
chooses to mention empirical SSK studies and their research practices only in passing. For 
instance, Kochan does not engage seriously with the Bath School and its Empirical 
Programme of Relativism (EPOR), although its contributions to SSK were no less important 
than those of the Edinburgh School. (Collins 1981, 1983) EPOR’s many case studies helped 
put the latter’s methodological tenets into action and thus give greater substance to what 
Bloor defines as the core of the Strong Programme. 
 
One can also consider the importance of methodology by returning to the issue of the 
external world. I have argued that the Strong Programme did not embark on an ontological 
mission. Kochan’s criticism of what he terms a ‘glass-bulb model’ relies on an inaccurate 
representation of what the tradition set out to do. I also believe that his criticism overlooks 
or belittles the methodological function of Bloor and Barnes’ realism. Kochan writes:  
 
Barnes does not actually argue for the existence of the external world, but only for 
the utility of the assertion that such a world exists. (2017, 29) 
 
‘Only for the utility’ implies that methodological uses and effectiveness are inferior 
parameters with which to judge the quality and appropriateness of ontological commitments. 
I believe that Barnes’s choice is at least in part methodological. It serves a form of research 
not concerned with ontological questions and instead intent on studying the lived workings 
of science and its knowledge-making. If Kochan is allowed to set his own research and 
writing goals, so are the Edinburghers. Moreover, this is a case of Kochan not embracing all-
important lessons from SSK. The tradition offers limited insights into the social if its 
methodology is not lent fuller attention.  
 
From Glass Bulbs to Light Bulbs 
 
I began by listing three claims which I believe capture Kochan’s key aims in Science as Social 
Existence. I then introduced one of his most important responses to Raphael Sassower’s 
review. Two questions bind the four claims together. First, what is a person’s work about? 
Second, does the work accomplish what it means to do? These help to evaluate Kochan’s 
treatment of work with which he engages, and to evaluate his success in doing so. In both 
cases, I believe that Science as Social Existence displays flaws.  
 
As I have demonstrated, Kochan misrepresents what Barnes, Bloor and others in SSK set 
out to do (he does not acknowledge what their work is about) and he does not employ SSK 
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material to resolve Heidegger’s limited understanding of the social (he does not accomplish 
an important part of what his book is supposed to be about.)  
 
One can understand the book’s problems by expanding on Kochan’s glass-bulb metaphor. 
Kochan contends that Barnes and Bloor commit to a division that separates people and the 
world they seek to understand: a ‘glass bulb model.’ His perspective would benefit from 
viewing the Strong Programme as a working light bulb. It may employ a glass-bulb, but 
cannot be reduced to it.  
 
To understand what it is, how it work and what it can offer, one must examine a light bulb’s 
entire constitution. Only by acknowledging what else is required to generate light and by 
considering what that light is meant to enable, can one present an accurate and useful 
analysis of its limitations and potential. It also shows why the glass bulb exists, and why it 
belongs in the broader system. 
 
Contact details: p.schyfter@ed.ac.uk 
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